− 2 − where i t is the current level of the interest rate, a is a constant equal to the equilibrium real rate of interest plus the target rate of inflation, π t is current inflation, π* is the target rate, x t is the output gap, and ε t a stochastic error term.
It was soon discovered, however, that such estimated equations did not fit well unless a lagged dependent variable was added, extending the equation to the following form:-i t = a + b 1 (π t -π*) + b 2 x t + b 3 i t-1 + ε t (2) In such regressions the value of b 3 was usually found to be quite close to, but somewhat lower than, unity, often around 0.8 or 0.9. This was generally ascribed to a tendency for the short run official response to a shock likely to affect the output gap and/or inflation to be much smaller than the ultimate long-run full equilibrium; such behaviour was usually attributed to the reasons for cautious gradualism first identified by Brainard (1967) .
Further work on the statistical characteristics of the time paths of official interest rates (see Sack, 1998 Sack, , 2000 Sack and Wieland, 2000; Goodhart, 1999) revealed that their particular feature was long series of small interest rate changes of the same sign, continuations of similar signed (small) rate changes being far more, and strongly significantly so, likely than reversals.
It was, and remains, far from clear that such a gradualist time path is optimal. As I wrote in my 1999 paper, (pp 235-6), `The key point is that the MPC should choose an appropriate future horizon at which to aim to return to the inflation target set by the Chancellor. By doing so, they should come close to minimising the variance of both output and inflation. Given that horizon, how then should the monetary authorities operate, according to the principles that flow from our models of the economy, always remembering, and I really want to emphasise this, that in most of these models the only uncertainty in the system is − 3 − additive and stochastic?
The answer to that conditional question is fairly clear. We should each month alter interest rates so that the expected value of our target, the forecast rate of inflation at the appropriate horizon about 18 months to two years hence, should exactly equal the desired rate of 22%. Lars Svensson has written several papers (e.g. 1997a, 1997b, 1999) on the optimality of such a procedure. If we start from an initial position in which the predicted forecast value of inflation is already close to the objective, then as a first approximation we should expect interest rates to respond to the unanticipated element in the incoming news. Since this is by definition a martingale series, often somewhat loosely termed a `random walk', then, on these assumptions, an optimally conducted interest rate path also ought to be nearly random walk. This is, broadly, what the generality of our economic models imply.' Neither I, nor I believe most of my colleagues, notably Willem Buiter, consciously aimed at gradualism, in the sense that we regularly voted to change interest rates by less than the amount we considered necessary to return inflation to target. Moreover my subsequent, and still continuing, work on the publicly available data on MPC forecasts supports the claim that the MPC's objectives were, indeed, to change interest rates so that inflation at the forecast horizon, two years, i.e. eight quarters t + 8 ahead, would be driven back to the target level, RPIX at 2.5%. Thus in my paper `What is the Monetary Policy Committee Attempting to Achieve', (2004a) , I conclude that, `What I claim to have established is that the MPC has indeed aimed to drive the inflation forecast into line with target at a two-year horizon, with this latter horizon − 4 − being well determined empirically.' Subsequently I have been exploring how regressions, of the general form of equation 2, for Taylor-type reaction functions alter if these were run against the relevant forecasts (for inflation and output i ) rather than actuals. The key result for me, (readers can find all the results set out in Goodhart (2004c)) , was that at an horizon of t + 8, the MPC appeared to act almost exactly so as to drive the forecast deviation of inflation from target ii back into line with the 2.5% target. What, however, I find remarkable is that, although there is considerable evidence that the MPC was not behaving in a gradualist fashion, still the actual outcome for the time path of interest rates appears to have been just as auto-correlated, with similar long-runs of continuations (and few reversals) in interest rate changes, as in earlier years or as in other countries. This can be seen in Figure 1 , where the frequency of reversals is, if anything lower, and the number of continuations, higher in recent years than before, (whether you take the break date as occurring in 1993 with the adoption of Inflation Targetry, or in 1997 with the adoption of Operational Independence).
So what is going on?
B. Arguments for Gradualist Behaviour
The central paradox of Section A is that the available evidence is that the MPC did not act in a gradualist fashion, and yet the outcome in the UK looked like gradualism. So on this reading of the evidence, arguments that gradualist behaviour is inherently desirable are beside the point. There was no prior intention to act in a gradualist fashion; something else caused that to occur.
Even so, it may be of some interest to list some of these arguments. The oldest established argument is that related to Brainard uncertainty, whereby uncertainty about the strength of the transmission mechanism, (of the coefficient on real interest rates in the IS curve), leads to caution in the exercise of that instrument. Indeed so, but uncertainty about the extent of persistence (coefficients on lagged inflation or lagged output gaps in either the IS or AS curve) and so-called `robust' policy responses (to minimise the likelihood of the − 6 − worst possible outcome) can by the same token make policy more aggressive (Schellekens, 2002; Sargent, 1998; Svensson, 1997c) .
Next, assume that the transmission mechanism operates via long rates of interest, and that long rates are determined by expected future short rates. Then a given immediate effect on long rates can equivalently be achieved by an immediate spike in short rates, expected to last only a short period, or by a much smaller change in short rates expected to last for a long period, (see Figure 2) . If there are reasons to lessen the volatility of the level of short rates (e.g. for reasons relating to the non-payment of interest on cash and hence an effect on the demand for money, or because of the zero-bound on nominal interest rates, see Woodford This example, however, relates only to a single shock. Assume, instead, that there are a sequence of shocks, and that the authorities can distinguish between major and minor shocks after they have hit. Then with large shocks hitting at A and B, and small shocks at intervening dates, a policy of a single step change (held for a long persistent period), gives a pattern with a lot of reversals as in Figure 4 . It is difficult to see what the authorities are doing, so the response of long rates to any change in short rates may be muted. If, on the other hand, the authorities combine persistence with gradualism, as in Figure 5 , then the longer-run policy stance of the authorities becomes far more easily discernible. Martin Ellison (2003) has written on `The Learning Cost of Interest Rate Reversals' and this is, in some part, a diagrammatic exposition of that.
A related problem facing the authorities is that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for outsiders to distinguish between a random walk path for policy that perfectly offsets the − 7 − martingale path of shocks, (and if `shocks' do not follow such a martingale are they properly described as shocks?), and a policy of indecision and lack of grip. Let me repeat a section from my 1999 paper, (pp 236-237):-`I want to contrast the normative theory inherent in our basic models with the public perception that such random walk behaviour is not optimal in practice. Thus, in The Times on Thursday, 11 June, under the headline `Anger grows at Bank's U-turn' (p. `There is an absolute yawning gap between the general perception of non-economist outsiders that reversals of policy, changes of mind, are to be deplored and castigated − 9 − as evidence of error, irresolution and general incompetence, and the apparent findings from our economic models that such reversals should optimally occur some four, or so, times more frequently than they do in practice. Maybe our models are missing something important. If not, we have then singularly failed to explain to the world at large how policy should be carried out. Either way, there is still an enormous amount of work to be done.'
There are, therefore, plenty of reasons why a Monetary Policy Committee might adopt gradualism as a preferred policy. The problem is that the evidence indicates that the MPC did not do so. Whenever the forecasts suggested that future inflation would deviate from target at the chosen two-year, eight quarter horizon, interest rates were immediately adjusted to eliminate that deviation. So why were interest rate changes auto-correlated?
C. The Constant Interest Rate Assumption
One candidate explanation is that this arises quasi-automatically from the forecasting and decision-making procedures hitherto espoused by the MPC. Partly for historical reasons, (owing to the unwillingness of the Bank to be thought to be infringing on the Chancellor's prerogative to set interest rates in the period 1993-1997), the Bank has traditionally done its main forecast on the conditioning assumption that interest rates are to be held constant at the level set at the latest previous decision date. As is well-known, constant nominal interest rates, beyond some horizon, will generate Wicksellian instability. Thus, except in rather rare cases, the trend (upwards or downwards) in the rate of inflation after the published horizon is likely to continue, and indeed often to become more exaggerated.
iii An example is given in Figure 6 .
− 10 − It is easy to see from this that simply rolling the forecast forward one quarter is likely to re-create the prior deviation of inflation from its target. Even if the MPC at each occasion thought that it was eliminating the deviation, a similar deviation was likely to recur at the next forecasting round. So auto-correlation of interest rate adjustments, whether for good or for ill, was, in a sense, built into the methods used by the MPC.
Undoubtedly there have been instances when the inflation forecast beyond the twoyear horizon did show a continuing (occasionally even a worsening) trend. This might then well suggest a continuing future path of interest rate changes of the same sign. Although now an outsider to such decisions, my impression is that the forecast/decision-making round in February 2004 has been a case in point. This syndrome is one of the reasons why critics have criticised a constant-interest-rate (CIR) path as a conditioning assumption for the forecast, and would prefer instead some kind of explicit path, as done in New Zealand.
iv Nevertheless the question of how far the CIR assumption necessarily induces autocorrelation into the MPC's decision-making process is, at least in part, an empirical issue.
One way of trying to get a quantitative handle on this is to note that inflation at time t is associated with higher output (growth) v at time t -4. Thus if it was the case that autocorrelations in interest rates was due to rolling forward trended inflation between t + 8 and t + 12, then one might expect to see that accompanied with above average growth in output forecasts from t + 4 to t + 8. In Table 1 Q1, the forecast in February for the contemporaneous quarter (t=0) was 3.04%, the forecast for 1998 Q2 was 2.33%, for 1998 Q3 was 1.76%, for 1998 Q4 was 1.64%, and so on down diagonally. In order to show more clearly what the forecasts for output growth for subsequent quarters were at each quarter's date, we rotate this table, also showing in column 1 the interest rate decision. This is shown in Table 2 . The associated forecasts for inflation shown in Tables 3   and 4. These tables, however, reveal that there appears to be a common feature of the forecasts for output growth. At short horizons these forecasts tend to underestimate outcomes, even more so when one uses the latest available data rather than those estimated contemporaneously. The most pessimistic forecasts are those for t + 0 and t + 1. At longer horizons the forecasts have tended to become steadily more optimistic on average, so that by the longest horizon, t + 7, t + 8, growth has been generally expected to be slightly above trend, (as contrasted with expectations of below trend growth around t + 0 till t + 4). Owing to the short sample, and the variance of the forecasts, such differences are, however, barely significant.
Nevertheless these, possibly systematic, tendencies for the output growth forecasts to change as the horizon lengthens raises the question whether one should compare each run of forecasts to the overall forecast average, or to the average forecast at each horizon. I have chosen to do the latter. Table 5 then reports the deviation of each forecast from actual after adjusting for the average bias in the forecast at that horizon, (i.e. the sum of deviations in each column adds to zero). Somewhat arbitrarily, we have given equal weight to each deviation between t + 4 and t + 8, and the resulting sum of these deviations is given in Column 9.
− 12 − The basic hypothesis is that strongly positive deviations (actual greater than forecast), implying low expected growth in the second year, would be associated with downwards trending inflation, and so under CIR would suggest a decline in interest rates in the next quarter, and vice versa for negative deviations. Again, somewhat arbitrarily, we assume that the sum of deviations is too low to influence a potential change in policy when it falls between +1 and -1. The resulting implied sign of interest rate effect is shown in Column 10, and the actual sign of the change in the final Column.
There is a strong concordance between the implied signed direction of effect and the actual interest rate changes between Q3 1998 Q3 and Q2 1999 Q3 . From Q3 1998 Q3 until 1999 the forecasts for output growth in the second year were consistently gloomy, and each subsequent quarter there were successive downwards adjustments in interest rates. Then in Q3 and Q4 1999 there were more buoyant forecasts for output growth in the second year, and upwards increases in interest rates in Q4 1999 and Q1 2000.
But for the rest of the period that can be examined in this way, the relationship is not strong. In eight cases, either there was no change in actuals when the deviation implied a change, or vice versa; in one case both indicated no change; and four instances when the output forecast suggested the opposite change to that undertaken, e.g. low expected growth but an interest rate increase in Q3 1998, and the reverse combination at the start of 2001.
A further, and essentially, similar test is to take the difference between the forecasts for both output and inflation, between t + 4 and t + 8, at the time that the forecast was first made (i.e. in 1997 Q3 for 1999 Q3), and compare it with the unanticipated changes in the inflation and output forecasts between t + 8 and t + 0 in successive forecasts. The question that this asks is whether the trends seen in output and inflation in the second year when the forecast was first made could be used to indicate the likely subsequent direction of forecast revisions on subsequent forecasting occasions. The data are shown in Table 6 . We regress − 13 − these subsequent revisions (for derivation see Goodhart 2004b ) against the earlier perceived second year trends, columns 4 and 7.
The results in Table 7 show that the second year forecast trends in inflation and output had no relationship with subsequent revisions to the output forecast. However, there are signs that an upwards trend in inflation in the second year was positively associated with subsequent upwards revisions to the forecast for inflation. This latter is consistent with the quasi-automatic CIR hypothesis.
Thus the evidence provides some support for the CIR hypothesis, but the relationship appears sporadic rather than continual, and at best of moderate strength and explanatory power.
We turn next to the final potential cause of gradualism that we shall propose here, (though we cannot rule out the possibility that we may have failed to consider other causes).
vii This is that the forecasters tended to make systematic, auto-correlated errors. ). Thereafter, however, the errors tended to be in same direction, i.e. inflation (and output growth) was systematically under (over) predicted, despite successive changes (gradualism) to offset this. Similarly, if inflation (or output growth) at any particular horizon was under (over) predicted at any particular horizon, it would tend to be similarly under (over) predicted on the next occasion. This is shown in Tables 8 and 9 where we report the prediction errors for inflation and output growth, (relative to contemporaneous actuals). The average values, standard errors and first order autocorrelations of the columns and rows of these deviations are also reported in these Tables.
Let us now use these Tables for a simple description of events. It is probably easiest to start with the forecasting errors in output growth, This picture, of auto-correlation in forecasting errors, is not quite so strong in the forecasts for inflation (Table 9 ). Here what seems to have happened in the initial years of our period is that the forecasters gave more weight to the presumptive effects of major exchange rate fluctuations on domestic inflation than was in practice justified. Thus there was a major devaluation of sterling in 1992, and inflation was over-predicted (negative deviations) in 1993 and 1994 . From 1995 and 1997 So, what we have sought to establish is:- (1) forecasting errors are auto-correlated, strongly so for output growth, less so for inflation.
(2) interest rate adjustments are used to offset such auto-correlated errors.
− 16 − Hence, by conclusion, the gradualism in interest rates derives in some large part from the autocorrelated errors of the forecasters. That this has been an important cause of gradualism, at least during this short sample period, seems patently clear.
Conclusion
The evidence, largely taken from Goodhart 2004c, indicates that the MPC was not seeking to behave in a gradualist fashion during our (short) data period, 1997-2003. So arguments in favour of such gradualist behaviour being consciously undertaken, though of themselves interesting, are somewhat beside the point.
Yet, ex post, the actual path of interest rate changes did seem as gradual, with consecutive small steps, as previously or in other countries. Why? We examine two hypotheses. The first was that this was a quasi-automatic consequence of adopting the constant interest rate (CIR) forecasting method. There, almost certainly, have been occasions where this played a role (1998/99 and 2004 being cases in point), but the tests used here suggested that this effect was sporadic rather than regular and persistent.
What did, instead, seem systematic in this period was for forecasting errors to be auto-correlated, strongly so for output, weakly for inflation. We also document (primarily in Goodhart 2004b) the tendency of policy-determined interest rate changes to be applied to offset such series of auto-correlated forecast errors, but only partially so. Hence I claim that gradualism, the auto-correlation in interest rate changes, has been, at least in this short time period, primarily a function of auto-correlated forecasting errors. iii Since such instability sets in seriously after this two-year horizon, simulations of longer term outcomes using the Bank model are done after the inclusion of some equilibrating Taylor-type reaction function into the model to take effect after t + 8.
iv There are a set of further arguments for, and against, the CIR assumption. For criticisms see Martijn and Samiei (1999) , Mayer (2001), Svensson (2003) . I have defended it, see Goodhart (2001 Goodhart ( , 2004 . viii Such errors can also be due to failures to observe the correct current level of the output gap, see Rich (2003) and Orphanides (2001) . Table 9 Differential between RPIX and forecast 
RPIX

